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Depositions of Corporations: Problems and
Solutions-Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)
M. Minnette Massey*
Rule 30(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' provides that
proper notice for the taking of a deposition of an organization need only
designate the matters on which discovery is sought, and not the individ-
ual(s) within the organization to be deposed. The organization2 then
names one or more of its officers, directors, or managing agents to appear
and to testify on its behalf with respect to matters known or reasonably
available to the organization. The organization may also designate per-
sons other than officers, directors, or managing agents, but only with the
designee's consent.
This Rule, added in 1970, is intended to reduce the difficulties encoun-
tered in identifying "managing agents."' It also attempts to aid the depos-
ing party by deterring the deponent from disclaiming knowledge of facts
known by the organization or by persons therein. At the same time, the
Rule attempts to protect the organization from having large numbers of
* Professor of Law, University of Miami, B.B.A., 1948, J.D. 1951, M.A. 1952, University of
Miami, LL.M. 1956, New York University.
I. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) states the following:
A party may in his notice and in a subpoena name as the deponent a public or private
corporation or a partnership or association or governmental agency and describe with
reasonable particularity the matters on which examination is requested. In that event,
the organization so named shall designate one or more officers, directors or managing
agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth, for each
person designated, the matters on which he will testify. A subpoena shall advise a non-
party organization of its duty to make such a designation. The persons so designated
shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. This sub-
division (b)(6) does not preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized
in these rules.
2. Since the great majority of cases involving organizations within the context of the Rule concern
corporations, the corporate entity will be the focus of this discussion. Although the case law and the
Rule itself recognize that 30(b)(6) is applicable to all types of organizations, including government
agencies, the corporate emphasis of this article is used solely for simplicity.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 30 (b)(6); Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Relating to Discovery: Advisory Committee's Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 514-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Advisory Committee's Note].
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officers and agents deposed by a party uncertain of who in the organiza-
tion has knowledge of the information being sought." The Rule outlined a
procedure designed to "supplement . . . the [previously] existing practice
whereby the examining party designate[d] the corporate official to be
deposed."5
The purpose of this article is to provide (1) a brief history of the back-
ground which led to adoption of Rule 30(b)(6); (2) an analysis of the use,
effect, and interpretation of the Rule; (3) a review of problems faced by
those using the Rule; (4) a proposed amendment to Rule 30(b)(6) con-
forming it with Rule 801(d)(2)(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and
(5) an analysis of Rule 30(b)(6) today.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY
Although a corporation or other entity may be a legal "person" within
the American system of jurisprudence, it has no voice of its own and must
speak through one or more of its agents. Under Rule 30(b)(6), the organi-
zation, upon receiving notice of deposition from the examining party,
must designate one or more of its officers, directors, managing agents, or
other persons for this purpose. Consequently, the primary problems that
have arisen under the Rule concern the identities of those who must be
produced for deposition and the extent to which the organization is re-
sponsible to produce such persons.
Prior to the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 26(a) governed the taking of corporate depositions. 6 Under this
Rule, the examining party had to determine which person or persons were
qualified to speak for the corporation regarding the matters upon which
one sought discovery. Rule 26(d) then governed the use of depositions of a
corporation's officers, directors, or managing agents, allowing their use for
4. Id.
5. Id. at 515.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1966) (superseded) stated the following:
When Depositions May be Taken. Any party may take the testimony of any person,
including a party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the
purpose of discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. After
commencement of the action the deposition may be taken without leave of court, except
that leave, granted with or without notice, must be obtained if notice of the taking is
served by the plaintiff within 20 days after commencement of the action. The attend-
ance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules, except that in admiralty
and maritime claims within the meaning of Rule 9(h) depositions may also be taken
under and used in accordance with sections 863, 864, and 865 of the Revised Statutes
(see note preceding 28 U.S.C. 1781). The deposition of a person confined in prison may
be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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"any purpose" permissible under the rules of evidence.' Rule 37(b)
greatly reduced the effectiveness of Rule 26, however, providing for sanc-
tions against a corporation only if one of its officers or managing agents
failed to make discovery.8 Thus, although Rule 26(d) allowed the use of a
deposition of a director as evidence against the corporation at trial, Rule
37 did not penalize the corporation when a director failed to attend a
deposition or refused to obey a discovery order. Taken together, the rules
had the effect of giving a party the right to examine a corporation
through its directors while denying any effective means of enforcing this
right.
The interaction of Rules 26(a), 26(d), and 37 spawned the "managing
agent" concept in the federal courts. The courts concluded that a corpora-
tion could not be compelled to produce one of its directors for examina-
tion unless the director had been so active or knowledgeable in the con-
duct of corporate affairs as to qualify as a managing agent.9
Judicial construction of the managing agent concept in cases dealing
with directors was, however, fairly straightforward. The paramount prob-
lem arose under former federal practice when the managing agent con-
cept was applied to the vast numbers of other individuals who were associ-
ated with the corporate entity. In an attempt to remedy that problem, the
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (1966) (superseded) stated in part:
Use of Depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evi-
dence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of
the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the follow-
ing provisions:
(I) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of contradicting or
impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.
(2) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking the deposition
was an officer, director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation, partner-
ship, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (1966) (superseded) stated in part:
Failure to Comply with Order.
(1) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to answer
any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the
deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him to an-
swer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document or
other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done, or to
permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 35 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in
regard to the refusal as are just . . ..
9. See, e.g., Proseus v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Rubin v. General Tire
& Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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federal courts formulated three major tests to determine which persons
qualified as managing agents.
The first test classified a corporate employee as a managing agent if he
was vested with broad general powers to exercise judgment and discretion
in the conduct of corporate affairs. 10 This standard posed problems be-
cause it required the corporation to produce only its upper-echelon execu-
tives or decision-makers. Such a development often undermined the pur-
pose of discovery because such persons frequently had little or no
knowledge of the information sought to be discovered.
The second test classified a corporate employee as a managing agent if
the employee, because of his status as an executive or advisor, would be
expected to obey an instruction from the corporation to comply with a
discovery order." This standard was also inadequate. It provided no
meaningful way to distinguish managing agents from any other employ-
ees, because virtually all employees might be expected to follow the em-
ployer's directives in order to ensure their continued employment.
The third test classified a corporate employee as a managing agent if
the employee tended to identify himself with the interests of the corporate
employer rather than with the interests of the adverse party seeking his
deposition.' 2 Again, this standard lacked a meaningful way to distinguish
managing agents from other employees, because most.employees will pre-
sumably identify their interests with those of their employer rather than
with those of a third party.
The pre-1970 procedure was further complicated by Rule 30(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which required that notice of the taking
of a corporate deposition include the name and address of the person to be
deposed or a general description of the person to be deposed.' This re-
quirement created problems because the examining party often did not
know the identity of those employees having knowledge of the relevant
facts which he sought to discover. The examining party was, therefore,
10. See, e.g., Shenker v. United States, 25 F.R.D. 96, 98-99 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Rubin v. General
Tire & Rubber Co., 18 F.R.D. 51, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
11. See, e.g., Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 15
F.R.D. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (dictum).
12. See, e.g., Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc. 24 F.R.D. 19, 25-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Krauss v. Erie R.R. Co., 16 F.R.D. 126, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (1966) (superseded) stated in part:
Time and Place. A party desiring to take the deposition of any person upon oral exami-
nation shall give reasonable notice in writing to every other party to the action. The
notice shall state the time and place for taking the deposition and the name and address
of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name is not known, a general
description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or group to which he be-
longs . . ..
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unable to identify such persons specifically or by their corporate positions
or job titles. Thus, the examining party was not able to provide an identi-
fication or description sufficient to meet the notice requirements of Rule
30(a). If the corporation challenged the notice, then the Rule would have
precluded the examining party from taking the corporate deposition.
As a result of this operation of former Rule 30(a), the examining party
frequently had to resort to other discovery devices in order to obtain
enough information to accurately identify knowledgeable corporate offi-
cials. Normally, the examining party used subpoenas to compel the depo-
sition of corporate agents as witnesses, or he would send interrogatories to
the corporation in order to learn the names of other agents.' 4 Only after
these additional discovery techniques had been used could the deposition
originally desired be noticed and taken. Thus, the pre-1970 procedure
forced the examining party to complete in two or more steps what could
have been accomplished in one.
Some courts' interpretation of the managing agent concept also forced
the examining party to use multiple discovery techniques. These courts
held that once a corporation raised the issue of improper designation in
the examining party's notice, the burden shifted to the examining party to
prove that the employee was a managing agent.'6 In order to meet this
burden, the courts forced the examining party to acquire additional infor-
mation from the corporation prior to noticing a corporate official for depo-
sition. Again, such efforts usually took the form of witness depositions or
interrogatories to known corporate officials.
Mistakes were costly. If the party chose to examine only those employ-
ees with higher status in the corporation, he then took the risk that such
persons had little or no relevant information to disclose. If he chose to
examine other employees having relevant information, he took the risk of
costly additional discovery if the corporation objected by claiming that
such persons were not managing agents. The ambiguities in the pre-1970
procedure presented the discovering party and the corporation with un-
necessary burdens. Both welcomed the 1970 rule change.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF RULE 30(b)(6)
To remedy the problems concerning the discovery of information from
corporations and other organizations, Rule 30(b)(6) was added to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1970.1' As the Advisory Committee
14. See, e.g., Mattingly v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 266, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
15. See, e.g., Proseus v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 26 F.R.D. 165, 167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. For the text of Rule 30(b)(6), see supra note 1.
1986:81]
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Note states: "The new procedure should be viewed as an added facility
for discovery, one which may be advantageous to both sides as well as an
improvement in the deposition process. ' 17 Specifically, the Committee
designed the Rule to:
1) Reduce the difficulty of the examining party in determining who
is a managing agent prior to deposition;
2) Lift the burden from the examining party of designating exactly
which corporate officials to depose;
3) Prevent the "bandying" by which corporate officials disclaim
knowledge of facts clearly known within the corporate structure; and
4) Assist corporations which find that a large number of their offi-
cials are being deposed by a party uncertain of which person has par-
ticular knowledge. 8
Pursuant to Rule 30, any party to an action may depose, by way of oral
deposition, any party or non party witness to the action. 19 Furthermore,
when a corporation is served pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), a subpoena is no
longer required to procure the appearance of the designated person.2 0 The
corporation must designate a proper person to testify and that person
must appear, or else the court can use Rule 37 to impose sanctions for the
corporation's failure to provide discovery under Rule 30(b)(6).21
There are some circumstances, however, in which the examining party
will still need to obtain a subpoena. A subpoena ad testificandum is re-
quired to depose non-parties in order to advise them of their duty to des-
ignate a person to testify pursuant to the Rule."2 Additionally, Rule 45
mandates the use of a subpoena duces tecum whenever the production of
documents is required.28 Rule 45 and not Rule 30(b)(6) answers the ques-
tions of whether the corporation must produce documents from locations
outside the court's judicial district and whether the person designated to
testify must travel from a location outside the court's judicial district for
purposes of examination."' As one court noted: "In short, Rule 30(b)(6)
17. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, at 515.
18. Id.
19. 86 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2102, at 367
(1970).
20. See id. § 2103, at 371.
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) states in part:
Sanctions by Court in Which Action is Pending. If a party, officer, director, or manag-
ing agent of a party or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on
behalf of a party fails to obey . ...
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). For text of the Rule, see supra note 1.
23. See, e.g., Ghandi v. Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 118 & n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1977); see
also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 2108 at 392.
24. See, e.g., Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 623-24 (5th Cir. 1973); Ghandi v.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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provides a procedure to use in determining the proper person to depose. It
does not deal with the issue of where the deposition is to be taken or
where the documents are to be produced."25
The courts disagree, however, as to the reach of a subpoena duces te-
cum served under Rule 30(b)(6) in conjunction with Rule 45. In Cates v.
LTV Aerospace Corporation,6 the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 30(b)(6)
cannot be used to require the production of documents in a judicial dis-
trict, where such documents are in the custody or control of an organiza-
tion located outside of that judicial district. The court stated that "a per-
son designated by an organization pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) could not be
required to travel outside the limits imposed by Rule 45(d)(2). '27
The district court in Ghandi v. Police Department of Detroit is in di-
rect conflict.2 s In that case, the Cates decision was specifically addressed
and found to be unpersuasive in view of the language of Rule 45. The
court opined:
Alternatively, this Rule provides that the Court may order a deposi-
tion to be taken at a place convenient to both the witness being de-
posed and the party seeking this pre-trial discovery. [citation omit-
ted]. A non-resident of the district may be ordered to appear at a
place within the district and produce documents requested in conjunc-
tion with the deposition if, in the opinion of the Court, a location
within the district would be a convenient place to take the deposition.
As [another court previously] noted:
A foreign corporation doing business in a district is subject to
all process, including subpoena, in the district, and if the doc-
uments are required in response to a subpoena, the court has
the power to order their production even though they are
physically located outside the jurisdiction.
[citation omitted]. Absent extraordinary circumstances . . . this doc-
trine should extend to all Rule 30(b)(6) organizations ... 29
Under the language of Rule 30(b)(6), the party seeking discovery may
"describe with reasonable particularity the matters on which examination
is requested." 80 The rule regarding subject matter designation is very
Police Dep't of Detroit, 74 F.R.D. 115, 120-22 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
25. Cates v. LTV Aerospace Corp., 480 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1973).
26. 480 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. Id. at 623.
28. 74 F.R.D. 115 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
29. Id. at 120-21 (citing Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 45 F.R.D.
515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). For text of the Rule, see supra note 1.
1986:81]
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broad and as long as the subject matter can be described with "reasonable
particularity," any request would appear to be proper. On balance, how-
ever, is the limiting language of the rule requiring that "the persons so
designated [by the organization] shall testify as to matters known or rea-
sonably available to the organization. 31
Thus, the proper designation of subject matter should include those
items the examining party believes, or has reason to believe, the organiza-
tion has knowledge of or are reasonably available. The words "reasonably
available"' 2 imply that the burden of obtaining the available information
cannot be unreasonable within the normal meaning of the words and the
circumstances of the case. The corporation is protected from overbroad
discovery as long as it lives up to the spirit of the word "reasonable."
III. A REVIEW OF PROBLEMS UNDER RULE 30(b)(6) AND COURT-
IMPOSED SOLUTIONS
Although Rule 30(b)(6) strikes a more even balance between the duties
imposed on the party seeking discovery and the organization from which
information is sought, problems nonetheless remain.
Proper designation of subject matter in the notice of deposition is both
essential and difficult. If the designation is too narrow, the information
requested may be so particular that no one in the organization will know
the answer. The burden of obtaining the information may be so great that
the request warrants the court's intervention. For example, suppose party
X serves notice pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) on company Y and designates
the subject matter as the number of threads per square inch in the fabric
of a quality man's suit. Company Y is the operator of a retail store which
sells men's suits. This kind of technical knowledge is probably unknown to
the corporation or unavailable without costly effort and research. Depend-
ing on the circumstances, such an expenditure could be excessively bur-
densome and, as such, be grounds for a court's protective action.
The overbroad designation is likely to create the same kind of situation.
If the request forces the corporation to expend a great deal of time and
effort to supply information which may be needed, then the court may
again intervene and modify or disallow the discovery request. For exam-
ple, in a recent case, the plaintiff served a subpoena on a non party corpo-
ration under Rule 30(b)(6), calling upon the company to:
produce competent witnesses and pertinent documents in response to
143 categories of questions, a number of which contain questions
31. Id.
32. Id.
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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within questions. The subpoena calls upon IBM to produce every doc-
ument, and recall every fact, conception, intention, understanding, be-
lief, and sense impression, in respect [to several different patents and
a preference profile]."
Before the subpoena was served, the corporation had voluntarily made
documents available to the plaintiff and had produced a witness for depo-
sition. The corporation contended that "to even attempt to respond fully
to the [subpoena would require] at least hundreds of professional man-
hours of effort over many months." The district court stated that "the
subpoena in its present form is entirely too broad and burdensome, and
will be quashed."35 The court further stated that questions which sought
only to confirm answers received through prior discovery should be asked
by deposition upon written questions pursuant to Rule 31."
A second problem area in interpreting Rule 30(b)(6) concerns the
meaning of the term "managing agent." The second sentence of Rule
30(b)(6) states that "the organization so named shall designate one or
more officers, directors or managing agents, or other persons who consent
to testify on its behalf . . . ."8 The meaning of the terms "officers" and
"directors" has caused no difficulty, but the term "managing agent" still
presents a definitional dilemma under Rule 30(b)(6), just as it did under
former Rule 26(d). 8
Most federal courts have continued to use the same three tests for de-
termining whether a deponent is a managing agent. 9 Before Rule
30(b)(6), these courts applied all of the tests with equal frequency to de-
termine status as managing agents.40 After Rule 30(b)(6), some of these
courts have suggested that the third test, identification with the interests
of the employer, is preferable.41
Other federal courts, however, have abandoned the three traditional
tests. Because the purpose of Rule 30(b)(6) is to simplify the procedure
by which a party could depose a corporate entity, these courts have aban-
doned the established managing agent tests and have adopted a more lib-
33. General Foods Corp. v. Computer Election Sys., Inc. 211 U.S.P.Q. 49, 49-50 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
34. Id. at 50.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). For text of the Rule, see supra note 1.
38. See supra text accompanying notes 10-15.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
40. See, e.g., Tomingas v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 45 F.R.D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
41. See, e.g., Groh v. Decker, 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-948, 72-954 (W.D. Mich. 1971); see also C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 19, § 2103 at 377-78.
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eral definition of the term.' 2 This more liberal approach represents a pol-
icy decision by these courts to provide discovery to examining parties in
accordance with the spirit of the current Rule. In some cases, these courts
have circumvented the established managing agent concept altogether,
substituting in its place a "persons most knowledgeable" test. 3
The more liberal approach adopted by some courts under Rule
30(b)(6) actually had its roots in a decision handed down two years
before the Supreme Court of the United States enacted the current rule.
In Tomingas v. Douglas Aircraft Co.,44 the cause of action arose out of
an aircraft crash that killed the plaintiff's decedent. The defendant-manu-
facturer supplied two of its engineers to assist the investigation team sent
to ascertain the reason for the accident. When the plaintiff subsequently
served notice pursuant to Rule 30(a) to depose the engineers, the defend-
ant moved to quash the notice on the ground that the engineers were not
managing agents. In refusing to quash the notice, the court held that the
"term 'managing agent' should not be given too literal an interpreta-
tion.' 5 Although the engineers were not managing agents within the
course of their everyday duties for the defendant corporation, the court
held that they should be classified as managing agents for the purpose of
giving testimony regarding the accident investigation.4a The court further
noted that the defendant did not show that his business would suffer from
the deponents' absence from their jobs.47 This left open the question
whether such a showing would be sufficient to justify the quashing of a
notice of deposition.
Although the Southern District of New York decided Tomingas two
years before the adoption of Rule 30(b)(6), decisions since 1970 serve to
fortify and expand its definition of managing agents as any knowledgeable
persons. One of these decisions, Robbins v. Abrams,"a may indicate the
outer limit on this kind of liberal construction. In Robbins, the plaintiff
moved to reopen discovery after receiving what it deemed unsatisfactory
responses from the corporate defendant. The court held that the corpora-
tion must produce (for deposition) the mother-in-law of one of the defend-
ant's former officers and the mother-in-law's German bankers, all of
42. See, e.g., Tomingas v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 45 F.R.D. 94, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
43. See. e.g., Robbins v. Abrams, 79 F.R.D. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also In re Arbitration
between Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority and Star Lines, Ltd., No. 79 Civ. 2659 (S.D.N.Y.
June 10, 1980) (available Oct. 26, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
44. 45 F.R.D. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. Id. at 96.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 97.
48. 79 F.R.D. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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whom were non parties to the action but were the most knowledgeable
with regard to the designated subject matter. The court concluded that
these witnesses did not fall into any of the categories of Rule 30(b)(6),
but reasoned that the defendant knew where the witnesses could be found
and that the familial relationships involved in the case made it appropri-
ate for the corporate defendant to produce them for deposition."9
The Southern District of New York once again expanded Tomingas in
the decision In the re Arbitration between Puerto Rico Maritime Ship-
ping Authority and Star Lines, Ltd.'0 In postjudgement proceedings, Pu-
erto Rico Maritime moved for an order compelling Star Lines to desig-
nate an agent or other person to appear for oral deposition in aid or
execution. Star Lines responded that the corporation existed in name only
and contended that no one was qualified to speak for the corporation be-
cause there were no longer any officers, directors, or managing agents. In
granting the motion to compel, the court ruled that two former directors
of Star Lines were the persons most knowledgeable about the subject
matter of the litigation and, therefore, that they should be designated as
the managing agents. 1
The court suggested nothing, however, to resolve the issue of whether a
designation can be compelled if a corporate entity no longer exists. Ar-
guably, designation of a person to appear for a deposition should not be
compelled if the corporation is defunct. Because of the clear wording of
the rule, courts generally have not compelled a designation under such
circumstances. After the corporate entity has terminated, normal deposi-
tion procedure is usually sufficient to permit discovery of former corporate
officials whose existence is known.
A third problem area under Rule 30(b)(6) concerns the rule's consent
requirement. The rule states that a corporation may designate persons
other than officers, directors, or managing agents, but only those "who
consent to testify on its behalf." 52 This provision raises the question
whether a corporation must produce an employee (an "other person"
under the rule) who refuses to testify. Although no case law directly ad-
dresses this issue, the advisory committee notes point out that "an em-
ployee or agent who has an independent or conflicting interest in the liti-
gation-for example, in a personal injury case-can refuse to testify on
49. Id. at 602.
50. No. 79 Civ. 2659 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1980) (available Oct. 26, 1984, on LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist. file).
51. Id.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). For text of the Rule, see supra note 1.
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behalf of the corporation."" Thus, it appears that a corporation cannot be
compelled to produce an unwilling employee even if the corporation's of-
ficers, directors, or managing agents are not knowledgeable on the subject
matter.
The final problem area in which the courts have had to interpret the
managing agent concept under Rule 30(b)(6) is in the relationship be-
tween attorneys and their corporate clients. Some courts have designated
the corporation's attorney as a managing agent. For example, in Groh v.
Decker,'" the Internal Revenue Service sought discovery of certain infor-
mation within the knowledge of the defendant securities company. By the
time of the discovery request, however, the company was no longer en-
gaged in securities business. The Internal Revenue Service named the
company's president and sole shareholder as the only individual defend-
ant, and he promptly asserted his fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination to defeat the discovery request. The plaintiff urged that the
defendant's attorney be designated for oral deposition. The court ruled
that although the attorney might fit into the category of "other persons"
who could be produced for deposition upon consent, even though he was
never an officer or director of the corporation, he should not be designated
as such an "other person" because he would never consent to testify
against his own client. 5 However, the court then looked to the broad
holding in Tomingas56 and held that the attorney met the requirements
for a managing agent and should, therefore, be produced for deposition.
This conclusion did not completely resolve the issue. The corporate at-
torney, as the deponent, could not be compelled to testify on certain mat-
ters within the protection of the attorney-client privilege. To protect the
privilege and to facilitate discovery, the court struck a compromise by
ordering the attorney to answer only those questions where the answer did
not violate the attorney-client privilege. If the attorney thought that an
answer to a specific question would violate the privilege, the court ordered
him to submit documents for in camera inspection. In these documents,
the attorney listed the answers he would have made but for the claimed
privilege, and the grounds on which he claimed the privilege.' 7 The court
thereby mitigated the discovery problem and provided a solution consis-
tent with the intent of Rule 30(b)(6).
Even when an examining party has properly served notice on an organi-
53. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, at 515.
54. 29 A.F.T.R.2d 72-948 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
55. Id. at 72-954.
56. Tomingas, 45 F.R.D. at 96.
57. Groh, 29 A.F.T.R.2d at 72-954.
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zation pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), has properly described the subject mat-
ter of the deposition, and the organization has properly designated a per-
son to answer on its behalf at deposition, problems may still arise.
Sometimes a deponent will claim the privilege against self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution." As noted
previously in Groh, the person designated to testify by the defendant cor-
poration was also its sole shareholder.5 9 The designated defendant de-
clined to answer, claiming the fifth amendment right against self-incrimi-
nation. In such a situation, the designee cannot be forced to answer, but
the corporation remains responsible for providing the requested
testimony.60
In another case, 1 the designee initially appeared without sufficient
knowledge to answer, but was aware that the desired information was
within the corporation's knowledge. The court ordered the designee to re-
turn to the corporation to obtain the information. The persons who were
the sources of the information invoked their fifth amendment privileges,
and the designee remained unable to answer. The court held that the in-
formation sought was gained by corporate employees in the course of
their employment and was therefore discoverable from the corporation.
Because the corporate officials refused to reveal the information to a per-
son designated by the corporation to disclose such information, sanctions
were proper against the corporation." If the court had not allowed sanc-
tions, the corporation, in effect, would have been able to invoke a right to
which it was not entitled. But while the court held that some sanctions
were proper, it chose to disallow the sanction of default. Because the ac-
tions of its officials prevented the corporation from disclosing the informa-
tion, the court felt that the extreme sanction of default would be inappro-
priate. Instead, the court ordered that the defendants could not introduce
any evidence regarding the matters surrounding the undisclosed
information. 8
A similar problem occurs when a party refuses or otherwise fails to
testify after receiving notice of deposition. The means for dealing with
such refusal or failure are within the discretion of the federal trial court.
Dismissal of the party's case is an extreme sanction that is available to
58. The organization itself is not entitled to use the privilege because it applies only to natural
persons.
59. Groh, 29 A.F.T.R.2d at 72-949.
60. Id. at 72-950.
61. In re Anthracite Coal Antitrust Litigation, 82 F.R.D. 364 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
62. Id. at 368-69.
63. Id. at 369-70.
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the court under Rule 37."
Another problem is that of a deponent who claims a lack of sufficient
knowledge. In an informal survey of federal judges conducted in prepara-
tion of this article, the judges surveyed stated that, in such cases, the
corporation's witnesses should either be excluded from testifying at trial
on matters upon which the deponent has claimed a lack of sufficient
knowledge, or that a continuance should be granted in order to allow the
deposing party an opportunity to question a knowledgeable witness or wit-
nesses." All of the judges agreed that the examining counsel should, on
request, be supplied with the general background of the proposed depo-
nent or deponents." They also agreed that all counsel should settle Rule
30(b)(6) discovery problems amicably, but that the party seeking discov-
ery should propound appropriate questions under Rule 31 and Rule 33 if
the opposing attorneys are unable to provide such information
informally. 7
Another problem occurs when the deponent claims insufficient knowl-
edge, and his attorney, or some other source, informs examining counsel
that a former employee is knowledgeable about the matters sought to be
discovered. The question arises when the corporation is responsible for
producing someone who is no longer associated with it, but who is the
most knowledgable person. Under the liberal decisions of Tomingas and
Puerto Rico Maritime, the corporation would probably be required to
produce the individual under the "persons most knowledgeable" test, pro-
vided that the corporation is aware of his existence and is not unreasona-
bly burdened by the requirement. Alternatively, the individual might be
produced under the "other persons" classification of Rule 30(b)(6). If,
however, the deponent is falsely claiming insufficient knowledge, it is un-
likely that he would "consent" under the "other persons" classification.
Finally, the corporation might possibly acquire the information from the
individual under the "reasonably available" language of Rule 30(b)(6).
The corporation would not be able to escape producing the information
unless the court was extremely conservative or there was a showing that
obtaining the information would be unreasonably burdensome.
Finally, a potential problem exists whenever a designated corporate
agent appears at a deposition and testifies to collateral subjects without
64. See, e.g., Atlantic Cape Fisheries v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 F.2d 577, 579 (1st Cir.
1975).
65. Informal survey of the United States District Judges, Southern District of Florida (Mar.
1985) (unpublished).
66. Id.
67. Id.
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objection. The corporation may later raise the objection that the agent's
questions and answers were beyond the scope of the designated subject
matter. The corporation may argue that the deposed agent acquired cer-
tain knowledge pertaining to the corporation on his own, and that disclos-
ure of this information was beyond the scope of the agent's corporate
knowledge and capacity. Because a definite subject matter must be speci-
fied by the terms of the notice, however, counsel and the discovered party
should be aware of the scope of the deposition being taken. According to
federal court judges, any failure of the discovered party to object to the
scope, or any failure to question the knowledge or capacity of the corpo-
rate deponent, should be deemed a waiver of any later objections.68
IV. USE OF THE FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) LANGUAGE TO SOLVE
THE "MANAGING AGENT" PROBLEM
The foregoing discussion illustrates many of the problems that can arise
under Rule 30(b)(6). A large number of these problems are directly at-
tributable to the rule's ambiguous "managing agent" concept. To solve
the problems created by this ambiguous concept and, moreover, to facili-
tate deposition use as evidence at trial, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure's description of corporate spokesmen should be enlarged by using the
language found in Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) 801(d)(2)(D). 9
Under FRE 801(d)(2)(D), a statement may be admitted into evidence as
an admission by a party opponent if it is "a statement by his agent or
servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employ-
ment, made during the existence of the relationship. '70
The Advisory Committee's Note accompanying Rule 801(d)(2)(D)
shows that the Committee intended the above definition to be interpreted
broadly.7 1 Before the enactment of the rule, the common practice was to
apply standard agency law, which did not allow a statement outside the
scope of employment (i.e., an unauthorized statement) to be imputed to
the employer as an admission . 2 Statements which could bind the em-
ployer were referred to as statements within the "speaking authority" of
68. Id.
69. FED. R. EvID. 801 states in part:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if -
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is...
(D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship ..
70. Id.
71. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee note.
72. Id.
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the agent.73 This test often resulted in the exclusion of the statement
since, as the notes point out, "few principals employ agents for the pur-
pose of making damaging statements. ' 4 Citing "[d]issatisfaction with
[the] loss of valuable and helpful evidence," the Committee sought to cor-
rect this problem by broadening the common law agency definition for use
in the Federal Rules of Evidence.7" Rule 801(d)(2)(D) eliminates the
need to examine a particular statement in determining its admissibility.
As Professor Weinstein notes: "Once agency, and the making of the state-
ment while the relationship continues, are established, the statement is
exempt from the hearsay rule so long as it relates to a matter within the
scope of the agency." 76
Courts have used Rule 801(d)(2)(D) successfully to admit statements
concerning a matter within the scope of agency or employment of "agents
or servants" who fall outside the definition of a managing agent that
would otherwise be inadmissible evidence on the ground of hearsay. For
example, in a personal injury action arising from an explosion of propane
gas inside the plaintiff's motor home, a statement made by the defend-
ant's employee (in charge of filling the gas tank) to an insurance adjuster
was properly admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).7 7 Similarly, in an admi-
ralty action against a maritime indemnity insurer for tortious interference
with the employment of the plaintiffs/seamen (by way of "blacklisting"
the plaintiffs as a high insurance risk), a statement by the defendant's
deceased insurance broker that medical expenses incurred by one of the
plaintiffs after a fire would not be paid was properly admitted because the
declarant was "speaking in his capacity as a broker" for the owner at the
time.78 As a final example, in an antitrust action by the United States
alleging a conspiracy to allocate contracts and to rig bids in violation of
the Sherman Act, a statement made on the telephone by a defendant's
secretary to the co-conspirator/witness was admissible under Rule
801(d)(2)(D). 79 The above examples illustrate the tremendous breadth of
the FRE language. The opponent can use testimony of professional ex-
perts such as staff engineers, chemists, doctors, and other technical per-
73. See, e.g., Northern Oil Co. v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 347 F.2d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1965).
74. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) advisory committee note.
75. Id.
76. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(D) [01], 801-221 to -221
(footnotes omitted).
77. Wright v. Farmers Co-op of Arkansas and Oklahoma, 681 F.2d 549, 552-53 (8th Cir. 1982).
78. Pino v. Protection Maritime Ins. Co., 599 F.2d 10, 13 (Ist Cir. 1979).
79. United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., 694 F.2d 312, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1982). The court
stressed that the record contained independent evidence purporting to show that the woman with
whom the co-conspirator/witness spoke was the agent of the defendant. Id.
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sonnel who are rarely "managing agents," but who often have vital evi-
dence in areas such as product design testing procedures in product
liability, breach of warranty, patent law, and other areas which may be
needed by the examining party.
The troublesome managing agent concept found in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure can be easily replaced by the "agent or servant" language
of the FRE. This change would facilitate the use of depositions at trial
and would also cut back on the time-consuming managing agent determi-
nation. Additionally, the rights of the objecting party could still be pro-
tected after the change. That party could obtain a protective order, an
exception for privileged communications, or could rely on the right
against self-incrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
While a party seeking discovery from a corporation may still have some
trouble obtaining a corporate deposition, the 1970 amendment of Rule
30(b)(6) has eliminated many of the problems. Before 1970, deposing a
corporation required a two-step process: first, discovery from the corpora-
tion of the proper identity of the knowledgeable person; and second, depo-
sition of that person by service directed to him rather than to the corpora-
tion. Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6), the party seeking discovery can now
notice a corporation and draft a subject matter designation with enough
detail to narrow the field of possible designated persons. If the examining
party can designate the subject matter narrowly enough, then possibly
only the person or group of persons who should be designated will be
produced.
On the other hand, if the limits of reasonable subject matter designa-
tion are exceeded, or the deposing party fails to designate the subject
matter with "reasonable particularity," 80 the court may intercede to limit
the inquiry. In this situation, the full range of discovery available under
Rule 31 (Depositions Upon Written Question) and Rule 33 (Interrogato-
ries to Parties) to aid in the subject matter designation under Rule
30(b)(6) are still available. Under this method, the party seeking discov-
ery would first use Rule 31 and/or Rule 33 to determine the following:
1) The names of those persons connected with the organization who
are most knowledgeable about the subject matter;
2) The background of each such knowledgeable person, including a
job description detailing the duties and powers of such person at the
time of the event in question;
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6). For text of the Rule, see supra note 1.
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3) An exact description, in fullest detail possible, of the scope of
each such person's knowledge. If this is not possible, then an exact
description of the scope of knowledge for the entire group of knowl-
edgeable persons; and
4) A table of the corporate structural organization that identifies
the location of the designee at the time in question.
If the party seeking discovery, either by informal means or pursuant to
Rules 31 and 33, obtains background information on the Rule 30(b)(6)
designees before deposing the corporation, many problems will be pre-
vented. Certainly, if a designee lacks the requisite background to properly
respond, this can be noted early on and a more suitable person can be
designated. Furthermore, a party that initially seeks discovery under Rule
31 and/or Rule 33 is in a superior position to use Rule 30(b)(6) as an
effective discovery tool. An examining party who has properly used all of
the discovery devices in conjunction with one another should be able to
discover the greatest amount of relevant information from the corpora-
tion. As the Advisory Committee stated, "[Rule 30(b)(6)] supplements
the existing practice .... ."" When properly used, the discovery rules
provide a powerful method to obtain all relevant information known or
reasonably available to an organization.
Proper use of the discovery rules does not, however, preclude the possi-
bility of discovery problems. Fifth amendment and attorney/client privi-
lege issues are unavoidable if an examining party wishes to depose the
other party's counsel. A district court recently denied both a motion to
dismiss various defenses and claims based on the party's refusal to answer
questions, and a motion for a protective order based on the fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination brought in opposition to the motion
to dismiss. 82 "Absent a court order compelling discovery [which the court
refused to give], and given the likelihood that the merits of the defend-
ants' claims can be more fully considered at trial, the court is reluctant to
dismiss the charges prematurely."8
Possibly, Rule 30(b)(6) could be amended to provide a category of de-
ponent designees classified as "knowledgeable persons associated with the
named organization." In view of the continuing effort on the part of the
courts to construe "persons most knowledgeable" as "managing agents"
for the purposes of testifying under the rule, such a change would elimi-
nate much of the strained reasoning that the courts have had to use to
81. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 3, at 515.
82. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Goepfert, No. 76 Civ. 802, (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 1980) (available Nov. 13,
1985, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file).
83. Id.
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give the rule effect. Further, the amendment would make it easier for
examining parties to reach those persons associated with the organization
whose actual knowledge make them best qualified to testify. Finally, such
a change is within the spirit and intent of the rule.
Alternatively, Rule 30(b)(6) should be amended to correspond to Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(D). By using the language "agent or ser-
vant," the problematic managing agent determination can be avoided and
much time and effort on the part of the courts, as well as the respective
parties, will be saved. Additionally, this broader definition will allow the
admissibility of evidence otherwise difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
For example, by using Rules 31 and 33 in conjunction with a broader
Rule 30(b)(6), the strategic attorney can target the right persons to de-
pose and no problem will be posed even if the individual is well below the
"managerial" level.
These proposals are not meant to suggest that persons without any sig-
nificant connection to the named corporation or other organization (for
example, simple shareholders) should be subjects under such a revision.
But, as case law indicates, present organization employees, former em-
ployees, organization counsel, and others so closely related to the entity
should be available for deposition if they are the persons most knowledge-
able about designated matters. Such persons are appropriately the best
qualified to speak for organizations receiving notice of Rule 30(b)(6)
depositions.
Ultimately, a test of reasonableness must apply. Parties can and should
anticipate that the courts will apply a reasonableness standard, and they
should seek to avoid costly and dilatory objections. The ultimate goal is to
uncover the facts necessary to render justice in the case. It is a goal de-
sired by the courts and necessary to the administration of justice.
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